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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BETTY J. WICKES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation,

Case No.
12598

BRIEF OF APPELLANT BETTY J. WICKES
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover $10,000 as the
"death benefit" owing under an automobile policy
issued by the defendant to the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both parties moved for Summary Judgment in
the lower court based upon· Answers to Interrogatories, Answers to Requests for Admission, Affidavits and depositions. The District Court, the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, granted the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Th.e Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment
in favor of the defendant and Judgment in favor
1

of the plaintiff, or in the alternative, that the matter
be remanded for trial in the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Homer W. Wickes and his wife, Betty Wickes,
were residents of Salt Lake City and were named
insureds on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant insurance company. The policy originally
was to cover the period from February 1, 1967, to
August 1, 1967. The policy was periodically renewed
at six-month intervals and was in continuous force
from February 1, 1967, to August 1, 1969, with the
exception of a brief lapse from February 2 to February 17, 1969. Two policies were issued by the
defendant to the Wickes family, one covering a
Volkswagen automobile and the policy in question
covering a 1962 Oldsmobile. The policy in question
(which is attached to the defendant's Request for
Admissions) provided what is known as "S Coverage" which provided for death indemnity in the
amount of $10,000 in the event of the death of a
named insured resulting from an accident and sustained while occupying an automobile (Insuring
Agreement IV, page 7 of the Policy). The Policy
provided that payments under the "S Coverage"
shall be made to the insured or to his surviving
spouse.
On August 2, 1969, Homer Wickes was killed
as the result of an automobile collision while he
was occupying the other owned and insured automobile, i.e. the Volkswagen.
2

Sometime prior to August 1, 1969, a semi-annual premium notice was sent to the insureds requesting payment of a premium in the amount of
$48.00. This notice provided that payment by the
due date, August 1, 1969, "continues this Policy in
force for six months." This notice was found several days after Homer's death by Jim Wickes, the
oldest son of Betty and Homer Wickes, in the office
in the church of which Homer Wickes was the minister. On about August 4, 1969, Jim Wickes contacted Mr. Starbuck, an agent of the defendant
insurance company with whom the Wickes family
had previously dealt. Jim informed Mr. Starbuck
of his father's death and a discussion was had as
to the existence of "S Coverage" on one or more of
the policies issued by the defendant to the "'Wickes
family (deposition of James Wickes, page 6; Affidavit of James Starbuck, paragraph 6).
Mr. Starbuck, in his Affidavit, stated that he
informed Jim on the telephone that the policy was
expired and that there would be no coverage for
Homer's death unless the premium was paid within
ten days from August 1. Jim Wickes testified in
his deposition that he did not specifically recall Mr.
Starbuck informing him of the 10-day time period.
(deposition of James Wickes, page 30, 31), and he
thinks that if he had been specifically told that, he
would have in fact paid the overdue premium in
the time period required (deposition of James
Wickes, page 13). There was apparently some con-
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fusion at that time as to which policy Mr. Starbuck
was referring, as Jim Wickes testified that he saw
no reason to pay for insurance on an automobile
that had already been in an accident, i.e. the Volkswagen (deposition of James Wickes, page 15).
James Wickes recalled that there was some provision somewhere in the policy to the effect that it
did not have to be paid exactly on time, but his
recollection on this point is vague (deposition of
James Wickes, page 8, 20). While not appearing
in the record, it should be noted that subsequent
to his deposition Jim Wickes was killed in the crash
of a military plane.)
The entire Wickes family was in a confused
situation during this period of time, as the entire
family went to Indiana for the funeral of Homer,
returned to Salt Lake, and then moved to Glendale,
Arizona, all between August 2 and August 13, 1969.
Betty Wickes testified that she had very little
to do with the financial affairs of the family, these
matters being handled by her late husband ( deposition of Betty Wickes, page 11-12), and that she
had no conversations personally with Mr. Starbuck.
On about August 13, 1969, at Jim's request, she
wrote out the check for $48.00 and mailed it to
Mr. Starbuck in Salt Lake City. This check was
accepted and cashed by the defendant insurance
company.
Betty Wickes testified that her husband occa4

sionally paid the premiums late (deposition of Betty
Wickes, page 29), and on at least one occasion the
premium was paid after the 10-day period had
lapsed (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, paragraph 3).
Sometime after August 1, 1969, a premium
notice similar to that attached to Mr. Smith's Affidavit as Exhibit 2 was mailed to the insureds. That
notice (hereinafter referred to as the "10-40 notice") provided that payment within 10 days of the
due date (August 1, 1969) would reinstate the
policy as of August 1 and coverage would be continuous; a payment received after 10 days, but
before the expiration of 40 days, would reinstate
the policy as of the date the premium was received.
This "10-40 notice" is not signed or executed by
either the insured or the insurance company. Neitheir Betty Wickes nor Jim Wickes were ever aware
of, nor to their knowledge had they ever seen, this
particular type of premium notice. After the $48.00
check had been mailed by Betty Wickes to Mr. Starbuck, she received another premium notice from the
insurance company. As she had already sent in the
premium payment, she called her son Jim (who was
then in Florida on active duty with the Navy) to
inquire as to what she should do. Jim advised her
to contact the nearest agent of the insurance company. On or about September 3, 1969, she contacted
Mr. Osborne, an agent of defendant in Glendale,
Arizona, and made inquiry as to the proper course
of action (deposition of Betty Wickes, page 14-15).
5

She wanted to make sure that there was complete
coverage straight through, with no policy lapse, so
that her husband's accident would be covered ( deposition of Betty Wickes, page 16). Mr. Osborne told
her that she should mail in another check, but that
she was covered and there was no problem. She
understood from Mr. Osborne that she would be
completely covered for the entire period of time
( deposition of Betty Wickes, page 20, 22). Subsequently, her second check was returned to her
uncashed. However, the $48.00 check dated August
13 was accepted and cashed by the company.
Betty Wickes later received another policy from
the insurance company indicating that insurance
had been reinstated as of August 18, 1969, and
which was to expire on the normal six-month anniversary date, February 1, 1970. The defendant
claims that the reason the entire premium was accepted for a shorter period of time was because premium rates were higher in Arizona than in Salt
Lake City (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, paragraph 4).
At no time prior to the issuance of the new policy
was Betty Wickes ever informed of this fact, nor
of the company's intention to write a shorter policy
period for the same premium. Betty Wickes testified that when she mailed the checks her interest
was in having continuous coverage and that she
assumed that since she paid the entire amount of
the premium that she was in fact covered and t~at
if the company was going to write a shorter pohcy
6

period then she should have been paying a smaller
premium ( deposition of Betty Wickes, page 22) .
At all times material in this lawsuit the defendant
had knowledge of all of the facts, specifically the
death of Homer W. Wickes. James Starbuck the
defendant's Salt Lake agent, was informed' of
Homer's death by Jim Wickes on or about August
4, 1969 (Affidavit of James Starbuck, para. 6). A
let1:€r from the insurance company to Betty Wickes
dated August 7, 1969, signed by Mr. Rasband,
offered condolences for the death of her husband.
The Contract of Insurance provides that the
policy period shall be as shown on the Declarations
page and for such succeeding periods of six months
thereafter as the required renewal premium is paid
by the insured on or before the expiration date of
the current policy period (Paragraph 1 of the Declarations page). The policy further provides in
Paragraph 7 of the Conditions portion of the policy
that certain agreements are void and of no effect
"if the premium for the policy is not paid when
due." Paragraph 5 of the Conditions section of the
policy provides that "the terms of this policy may
not be waived or changed except by policy Endorsement attached hereto, signed by an executive officer
of the company."
Demand was duly made 'upon the company for
$10,000 as the amount of the "death benefit" owing.
The company denied liability, claiming that the
7

policy had expired at midnight on August 1, 1969,
because the renewal premium had not been paid
within ten days from the due date. Subsequently,
this lawsuit was initiated.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I.

"S COVERAGE" IS LIFE INSURANCE AND AS SUCH
MUST CONTAIN A 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD.

POINT II.

THERE WAS A GRACE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS AFTER
THE EXPIRATION OF THE POLICY AND A LOSS WITHIN
THAT TIME IS COVERED.

POINT III.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREMIUM DUE BY THE INSURANCE COMP ANY AFTER NOTICE OF THE LOSS IS A
WAIVER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM AND
COVERAGE IS EXTENDED FOR THE LOSS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

"S COVERAGE" IS LIFE INSURANCE AND AS SUCH
MUST CONTAIN A 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD.

The "S Coverage" constitutes life insurance.
The policy provides that the insurance company will
pay the
amount stated as applicable to the insured
designated for such coverage in the J?eclarations in the event of the death of each msured
which shall result directly and independently
of all other causes from bodily injury caused
8

by . acciden~ and sustained by the insured
while occupmg or through being struck by an
automobile. . . .
Section 31-11-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
defines life insurance as "Insurance on human lives
and insurances appertaining thereto or connected
therewith."

Bkick's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition) defines life insurance as follows:
That kind of insurance in which the risk
contemplated is the death of a particular person; upon which event (if it occurs within a
prescribed term, or according to the contract,
whenever it occurs) the insurer engages to
pay a stipulated sum to the legal representatives of such person, or to a third person having an insurable interest in the life of such
person.
Obviously, the "S Coverage" contemplated the
risk of the death of one of the named insureds, and
by any reasonable definition is, substantively, life
insurance. Section 31-22-2, Utah Code Annotated
( 1953) provides in regard to policies of life insurance that
There shall be a provision that a grace
period of 30 days, or, at the option of the
insurer of one month of not less than 30
days . : . shall be allowed within which the
payment of any premium after the first may
be made during which period of grace the
policy shall continue in full force. . ..
9

The public policy of the State of Utah as expressed in Section 31-22-2 should be given effect.
Citizens of the State of Utah, and the Appellant
herein, are entitled to consider a policy which insures the life of an individual, whether it is part of
an automobile policy or not, as "life insurance,"
and are entitled to the normal expectations relating
thereto as are required by Section 31-22-2. The statutes of the State of Utah, and the insurance policy
herein involved, should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the public policy of the State of Utah
and coverage should be extended to the Appellant
herein.
Chapter eleven of the Insurance Code contains
requirements relating to the amount of capital funds
that insurance companies are to have prior to being
allowed to transact business within the State of
Utah. In that same chapter various types of insurance are defined, including life insurance (as above
set forth). Section 31-11-6 provides that insurance
against accidental death or injury to persons in or
near a motor vehicle, when such insurance is issued
as part of insurance on the vehicle, shall be deemed
to be "vehicle insurance." Presumably, the Respondent contends that by virtue of that section the "S
Coverage" herein involved is "vehicle insurance"
and not subject to the 30-day grace period. It is
the Appellant's position that that section is not dispositive of this case, as it is primarily concerned
with what types of insurance companies are required
10

to have what amounts of capital funds. To define
"S Coverage" which is included in an automobile
policy as "vehicle insurance" is illogical; it is as
logical as concluding that the automobile insurance
on Mr. Wickes' Oldsmobile is life insurance because
it was (in the words of Section 31-11-2) "insurance
on human lives and insurances appertaining thereto
or connected therewith."
Section 31-1-14, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
provides that provisions of the Insurance Code
which relate to a particular kind of insurance prevail over provisions relating to insurance in general.
It is submitted that the portion of the Insurance
Code defining "life insurance" and "vehicle insurance" should be restricted to the issue of capital
fund requirement, and should give way to the specific requirement imposed by Section 31-22-2.
The insurance in question, i.e. the "S-Coverage," is obviously life insurance as it contemplates
as the risk insured against the death of one of the
named insureds. It requires no tortured reasoning
or clever logic to conclude that it is in fact, and in
substance, "life insurance," and thus must meet the
requirement of Section 31-22-2 and contain a 30-day
grace period. It is conceded by the parties to this
lawsuit that the death of Homer Wickes occurred,
and the premium was paid and accepted, within 30
days from the expiration of the policy period. Thus,
there was coverage and the defendant is liable for
the amount payable under the "S Coverage."
11

POINT IL
THERE WAS A GRACE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS AFTER
THE EXPIRATION OF THE POLICY AND A LOSS WITHIN
THAT TIME IS COVERED.

The defendant claims that there was no coverage on August 2 because the premium had not been
paid within ten days from August 1, and relies upon
the "10-40 notice" as furnishing the basis for this
contention. That notice provided that if the amount
of the premium due was received by the company
within ten days from August 1, then coverage would
be continuous; however, if the premium was received
aften ten days after the due date, but within 40
days after the due date, then coverage was to be
reinstated as of the date the premium was received
by the insurance company. The plaintiff contends
that a loss which occurs within a grace period is
covered regardless of whether the premium is paid
when due, or at all.
The "10-40 notice" provides a period of time
after the normal expiration of the policy within
which the premium can be paid and which will, if
paid, keep the policy in good standing. A "grace
period" is defined as "a period beyond the due date
of premium during which insurance is continued in
force and during which payment may be made to
keep policy in good standing," Black's Law Dictio~
ary (Fourth Edition). The terms of the "10-40
notice" obviously give rise to a grace period. The
policy, and any modifications thereof by the insurer,
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attempted or otherwise, should be construed liberally
in favor of the insured. In Tucker vs. New York
Life Insurance Company, 155 P.2d 173, 107 Utah
478 (1945) the following rule is stated:
... The rule of strictissimi juris has been
applied almost universally to insurance contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others,
has declared in favor of a liberal construction
in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was taken out
and for which the premium was paid.
Cases involving similar policies and notice provisions have arisen in other jurisdictions. It is submitted that the weight of authority, and _the bettered-reasoned view, is represented by cases such
as Pickens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 144 S.E.2d 68 (So. Carolina 1965).
In that case, in a situation similar to the one involved here, the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that provisions such as are found in the "10-40
notice" give rise to a grace period. The court specifically rejected the contention of the insurance
company that the expiration notice was merely an
offer to renew. In that case the premium had been
tendered to the insurance company within the 10day period. However, the weight of authority appears to be that the tender of the premium is not
required to be made within the grace period.
In Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama vs. Colquitt, 168 So.2d 251, the court stated the rule that:
13

. Whe:r; .a lo~s occurs within the grace
period, givmg rise to an obligation by the
underwriter to the insured for an unencumbe_red sum at least equal to the unpaid premium, then the premium is deemed to have
been paid and the term of the policy appropriately extended.
The same rule is followed in Meadows v. Continental Assurance Company, 89 F.2d 256, (Fifth
Cir. 1937) wherein it was held that where the death
of the insured occurred during the grace period the
policy must be paid, less the amount of any premiums owing to the company by the insured.
In Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sections 7960 and 7961, it is said that a loss which
occurs after the expiration of the grace period is
not covered. However, Appleman states the general
rule as "that if the insured dies during the grace
period, his death is covered."
Two jurisdictions have held that terms such as
are found in the "10-40 notice" constitute merely an
offer to renew and that if the premium is not received within the period of time set forth, then the
offer was not accepted and there was no insurance
after the due date. McClure v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, 148 S.E.2d 475
(Georgia 1966); State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company vs. Robison, 461P.2d520 (Ariz.
1970). It is submitted by the Appellant that these
cases should not be followed in Utah as they are
14

poorly reasoned and do not declare in favor of "a
liberal construction in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was taken
out and for which the premium was paid," Tucker
vs. New York Life Insurance Company, Supra.
The better rule, which should be the law of this
jurisdiction, is that such a notice gives rise to a
grace period and that any loss occurring during the
grace period is covered. The insurance company
should be obligated to pay the amount due under
the "S Coverage," less any premium which would
be owing by the insured to the insurance company.
POINT III.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREMIUM DUE BY THE INSURANCE COMP ANY AFTER NOTICE OF THE LOSS IS A
WAIVER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM AND
COVERAGE IS EXTENDED FOR THE LOSS.

In Point I and Point II in this Brief the Appellant argues that the nature of the insurance, and
the "10-40 notice," give rise to a grace period. Alternatively the Appellant contends that the "10-40
notice" is immaterial and the terms thereof are in
no way relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
The "10-40 notice" does not meet the requirements of the statute or the policy, and cannot vary
the terms of the basic policy of insurance. The policy
itself provides that the terms thereof may not be
changed except by an Endorsement attached thereto
and signed by an officer of the insurance company.

15

In addition, Section 31-19-26, Utah Code Anrwtated
( 1953) provides that "no modification of any insurance contract shall be effective unless in writing
executed by the insurer.... " The form of execution
is defined in Section 31-19-20, Utah Code Annotated
( 1953), and requires at least a facsimile signature
of the insurer or an officer thereof. Section 31-19-18
'
Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides that "no
insurer or its agent ... shall make any contract of
insurance or agreement as to such contract, other
than as plainly expressed in the policy issued thereon. Any such understanding or agreement not so
expressed shall be invalid."
In Barnett v. State Automobile and Casualty
Underwriters, 487 P.d 311 (Utah 1971) these statutes were construed and held to mean that the basic
policy of insurance cannot be modified by other writings or conduct not meeting the requirements of the
statutes. Thus, whether the insureds herein complied exactly with the terms of the "10-40 notice"
is immaterial; that notice is an attempted modification of the basic terms of the policy, is invalid,
and the Appellant herein may rightfully object
thereto.
The policy of insurance provides that the policy
period is as shown on the Declarations page and for
such succeeding periods of six months thereafter
as the required renewal premium is paid by the
insured on or before the expiration of the current
16

policy period. Thus, it is the clear intention of the
policy itself that coverage terminates if the premium
is not paid by the due date. However, the terms of
the policy may be waived by the insurance company.
The actions of the defendant in accepting the entire
amount of the premium due constituted a waiver of
the policy terms requiring prompt payment, the
policy did not expire on August 1, 1969, and coverage is extended for the death of Homer Wickes.
The basic rule is stated in Loftis v. Pacific
Mutiwl Life Insurance Company of California, 114
P.134, 38 Utah 532 (1911):
That insurance companies may waive
prompt payment of policies, although such
payment is of the essence of the contract of
insurance and may continue and treat policies
in force after all rights thereunder had lapsed
by reason of a provision therein that nonpayment of the premium or any part thereof
shall cause the policy to become void and of
no force or effect, is too well settled to admit
of dispute.
An extensive collection of cases are collected in
7 A.L.R. 3d, 414, and supports the proposition that
acceptance of a past-due premium after knowledge
of the loss constitutes a waiver of the timely payment of the premium; this appears to be the overwhelming view in all American jurisdictions.
In Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, Section 17.42, the rule is stated as follows: "acceptance
17

of unearned premiums is cogent evidence of an
election to forgiving all known grounds of forfeiture." It is further stated than "when an insurer
receives and intentionally cashes a check for pastdue premium, it waives its right to hold the policy
invalid for nonpayment of premium."
In 43 AmJur 2d Section 1129 it is stated that
On the other hand, in many cases it has
been held, especially where the policy was of
the type providing for forfeiture upon nonpayment of premiums, that at least in the
absence of a provision making all premiums
earned upon default, the insurer might rwt
accept and retain after loss, with knowledge
thereof, premiums covering the period of default, without being liable for the loss occurring during such period. (Emphasis added.)
In Seavey vs. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 889, 244
Minn. 232, 52 A.L.R. 2d 1144 (1955), it was held
that the invalidity of an automobile collision and
liability policy for non-payment of premium was
waived where the insurer, with full knowledge of
the accident, accepted and retained the premium
after the accident had occurred, the company had
investigated the accident, and had required and received the insured's cooperation in the investigation
of the accident.
In the case at hand, the record is clear that the
loss occurred one day after the policy allegedly expired, that the company had notice of the loss and
that it thereafter, with full knowledge of all the
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facts, accepted the entire am9unt of the premium
due. The law is clear that in such a situation coverage is continuous and the policy is not forfeited.
Perhaps the leading Utah case in this area is
Loft'is vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
of California, Supra. In that case a group of railroad employees had accident policies with the defendant insurance company. An agreement was
entered into between the employees and the insurance company whereby the insurance company was
to deduct monthly premiums from the wages due to
the insureds by the railroad company. The policy
contained the usual provisions prohibiting changes
or modifications therein, provided that any failure
to deduct the premium payment from the wages was
at the insured's risk, and provided that the policy
would be void if the monthly premiums were not
duly paid. It appeared that the first policy period
commenced May 28, 1908 and ended July 28 the
same year. The second insurance period ended on
September 28, 1908. The insured was killed on October 14, 1908. The insured did not earn sufficient
wages during August and September to pay the
premiums, but he did earn sufficient wages during
October to pay the premium for that month and the
premiums in default for the two prior months. The
entire amount owing was forwarded by the railroad
company to the insurance company after the insured
was killed. The insurance company subsequently
refunded the amount paid, which was tendered by

19

the. railroad company to the insurance company
agam, but refused. The insurance company contended that since the payments were in default at
the time of the insured's death, the policy had lapsed
and there was no coverage. Chief Justice Frick
held that there was coverage and sustained the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court noted that
whether a waiver of timely payment of the premium
has taken place ordinarily depends upon the peculiar
facts and circumstances of a given case. The court
said that "where a waiver prevents a forfeiture, the
law ordinarily permits a liberal construction to be
placed on the acts of the party waiving with the view
of bringing about a waiver of such a forfeiture."
The court noted that no specid or formal act by the
insurance company was required either to terminate
the policy or to keep it in force. The insurance company, by demanding and receiving the past-due and
the future installments of the premium could continue in force lapsed policies. The court said:
If the policy was in force so as to authorize the Appellant (insurance company) to
demand and receive the premium due for
August, it must likewise be held to have remained in force for all other purposes. . . .
That insurance companies may waive prompt
payment of policies, although such. payment
is of the essence of the contract of msurance
and may continue and treat policies in force
after all rights thereunder had lapsed by
reason of a provision therein that non-payment of the premium or any part thereof
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shall cause the policy to become void and of
no force or effect is too well settled to admit
?f dispu~.... If an insurance company or
its authorized agent, by its habits of business
or by its acts or declarations, or by a custo~
to receive overdue premiums without objection, or by a custom not to exact prompt payment of the same, or, in brief, by any course
of conduct has induced an honest belief in the
mind of the policyholder, which is reasonably
founded, that strict compliance with the stipulation for punctual payment of premiums
will not be insisted upon, but that the premium may be delayed without a forfeiture
resulting therefrom, it will be deemed to have
waived the right to claim the forfeiture, or
it will be estopped from enforcing the same,
although the policy expressly provides for forfeiture for non-payment of premiums as stipulated, and even though it is also conditioned
that agents cannot waive forfeitures.
The court in Loftis relies heavily on Joyce on
Insurance, and quotes verbatim Section 1379:
As a general rule, if the company has
treated the policy as valid, and has sought to
enforce payment of the premium, or has
otherwise with knowledge recognized, by its
own acts or declarations, or those of its agents,
the policy as still subsisting, it waives thereby
prior forfeitures.
In the Loftis case, the insurance company accepted the past-due premium without knowledge of
the insured's death and subsequently refunded the
premium. In this case, State Farm Mutual treated
the policy in full force and effect for the purpose of
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collecting the $48.00 premium any time within ten
days after the due date. If the policy was not in
force at that time, then the company had no right
to attempt to collect the premium and provide in the
"10-40 notice" that coverage would be "continuous."
In addition, with full knowledge of the loss, the company accepted the full amount of the premium due,
thereby waiving timely payment of the premium and
leading inescapably to the conclusion that coverage
was extended at the time of the death of Homer
Wickes. In the Affidavit of A. F. Smith, it appears
that the "10-40 notice" was mailed out three days
after the due date of August 1, 1969. The company
cannot claim on one hand that there is no insurance
when it comes time to pay the benefit, but claim on
the other hand that it has the right to solicit and
collect the premium payment.
In Sullivan vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 64 P.2d 351, 91 Utah 405 ( 1937), a quarterly
life insurance premium payment was required to be
made by October 6, 1932. On about October 15, the
insured's wife talked to the insurance company and
they indicated that the payment could be made after
the grace period. After the grace period had expired
the company accepted the entire premium due. The
company subsequently contended that since the payment had been made after the grace period there
was no insurance extended at the time of the loss,
which also occurred after the expiration of the grace
period. The court held that there was coverage and
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that the company had waived timely payment of the
premium. Even though the policy contained the
usual provisions prohibiting modifications thereof
except in writing, the court held that a general agent
could waive timely payment of premiums regardless
of provisions in the policy to the contrary. The court
stated the general rule as:
Where there has been a default in the
payment of a premium or an assessment justifying a forfeiture of the contract, such forfeiture is waived if, with knowledge of all the
facts, the insurer, either before or after the
death of the insured, unconditionally accepts
and retains the specific premium or assessment for which the insured was delinquent.
(At page 362.)
The court in Sullivan also recognizes the rule
that the company cannot treat the policy as valid
for attempting to collect premiums, but claim that
it was forfeited when claim is made for the benefits
of the policy. The undisputed facts in this case dis.:..
close that the premium was overdue and that in the
face of that knowledge, and with knowledge of the
death of Homer Wickes, the company ( 1) assured
the plaintiff that coverage would be continuous if
she paid the amount of the premium due and (2)
accepted the entire amount of the premium. It is
submitted that the facts of this case fall squarely
within those in Sullivan and that the Appellant is
entitled to Judgment.
Ellerbeck vs. Continental Casualty Company,

23

227 P.805, 63 Utah 530 (1924) involved a similar
situation. A renewal certificate for a policy of
health and accident insurance was mailed to the
plaintiff in September, 1922. The certificate contained the provision that the policy would be continued in force from October 8, 1922, for one year
if the premium was paid before October 8, 1922.
On October 1, November 1, and December 1 of that
year, the insurance company mailed to the plaintiff
statements requesting payment. Sometime between
December 1 and December 8, 1922, a conversation
was had between the company and the insured generally to the effect that the insured desired to maintain the insurance. No additional statements or
demands were made upon the plaintiff to pay the
premium. On February 23, 1923, a partial payment
of $60.00 was paid on the premium and was accepted
by the company. On March 1, the remainder of the
premium was paid. On February 24, 1923, the plaintiff was taken to a hospital and it was admitted that
the sickness causing the disability began sometime
prior to February 24, 1923. The defendant contended that there was no coverage between the date
that the payment was actually due and the date that
the payment was actually made. In affirming the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and striking
down this argument (similar to that made by the
defendant in this case) the court used the following
language:
By the terms of the policy the plaintiff,
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so long as the policy was not cancelled had
th~ right to ma.ke the annual paymen'ts to
remstate the pohcy so as to afford protection
f?r accident~ a~ter the date of payment and
sickness begmnmg 10 days thereafter. It is
therefore contended by counsel for defendant
that, even though a waiver of payment was
made by the defendant, or an extension of
credit given, such credit would not keep the
policy in force between the date of payment
as fixed in the policy and the date of actual
payment. The courts usually do not concur
in that construction of similar provisions in
insurance policies. As stated, the insured had
a legal right to reinstate his policy by making
the annual payment as stipulated in the policy.
His rights upon such payment are fixed by
the terms or provision of the policy. Under
the construction of the provision contended
for by defendant's counsel, there would be
nothing gained for plaintiff in this case by
either a waiver or an extension of credit.
In the instant case, the waiver of timely payment was made by the defendant's agent in Arizona,
Mr. Osborne. This waiver was made after the alleged 10-day period, just as the waiver in the Ellerbeck case was made after the premium was more
than two months overdue and more than one month
after the expiration of the grace period.
Parker vs. California State Life Insurance Company, 40 P.2d 175, 85 Utah 595 (1935) involved an
accident insurance policy. The policy was originally
issued on March 23, 1929 when the first annual
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premium was paid. The insured did not pay the
second premium which was due on March 23, 1930.
On April 15, 1930, the insured upon condition that
the policy be continued in force, entered into an
agreement with the insurance company under the
terms of which it was provided that the insured
would pay a small amount of cash and execute and
deliver to the insurance company a promissory note
in a larger amount in payment of the second annual
premium. The note provided that if the note was
not paid on or before the date it became due, it
thereupon automatically ceased to be a claim against
the insured and the policy was then to be the same
as if the cash had not been paid nor that agreement
ever made. The note was not 1:m~ci '!.-!~Jon its du:J dL:,,
September 23, 1930. On September 26, 1930, the
defendant insurance company mailed a letter to the
insured stating that the insurance was delinquent,
suggested that they believed the default might be
an oversight on the part of the insured, and enclosed
a blank paper to be used by the insured in applying
for reinstatement. The reinstatement application
provided that the policy would not be considered
reinstated until approved by the home office. They
at that time offered to give an additional extension
of time or to accept smaller installment payments.
After the application and the letter were received,
the insured filled out the application form and mailed
it along with a small amount of money to the company. Before the application and the money were
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received, the insured was killed. When the money
was received by the company they knew of the death
of the insured and immediately returned the money.
The defendant contended that the policy had lapsed
because of the failure of the insured to pay the note
given for the premium on the date due. The court
held that there was insurance, regardless of whether
the company had accepted the partial payment or
not. The court held that the company could not treat
the policy in force for purposes of attempting to
collect premiums and then turn around and claim
that the policy was out of force for purposes of
paying the benefits due thereunder. The court noted:
... although the note executed on the
23 of March provided that, if the note was
not paid, it would automatically cease to be
a claim against the maker, still the company
continued its efforts to collect. It might be
said that they were attempting to collect upon
the premium, but that can make no difference.
They were, in fact, attempting to collect from
the insured money due as a payment in advance for the insurance. There is no justification for attempting to collect either upon
the note or the premium unless there was a
recognition by the company of an obligation
on their part under the policy. (Emphasis
added.)
The court further noted that where rights of
forfeiture are created by contract they are for the
benefit of the party privileged to declare the for-

27

feiture, m this case the insurance company, and
stated:
Such party may, if he desires waive his
rights. Forfeitures have not bee~ and are
not now favored by the law. Courts have
always given a liberal interpretation to the
acts and conduct of a party holding a right
of f?rfeitu~e. Ar:y acts or statements suggestmg an mtent10n to keep a contract alive
are liberally construed as a waiver of the
right of forfeiture.
In this situation, the Respondent, State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company, obviously felt that the
policy was in effect for purposes of attempting to
collect the premium. As previously noted, the "1040 notice" was mailed out three days after the due
date, i.e. August 1, 1969. The company, as the above
cases so pointedly declare, cannot claim on one hand
that there is no insurance when it comes time to pay
the benefit due, but claim on the other that it has the
right to solicit the premium payment. If the policy
was in effect during the 10-day period between
August 1 and August 11, 1969, for purposes of
soliciting the premium, the policy was also in effect
for purposes of paying the benefits the company is
contractually obliged to pay.

In Farrington vs. Granite State Fire Insurance
Company, 232 P.2d 754, 120 Utah 109 (1951) it
appeared that the insurance company had insured
a building owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had
received the policies in March, 1949, and shortly
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thereafter had advised the defendant's agents of the
condition of the building. Premium payments were
made in the amount of $50.00 each on March 21
and April 19. On April 22, the building was destroyed by fire. On June 9, the company accepted
the remaining portion of the premium. The company subsequently attempted to relieve itself of responsibility by claiming that there had been misrepresentations and concealments regarding the condition of the building and that it was entitled to
avoid the policy. All such facts were known, however, to the insurance company at the time it accepted the final premium payment on June 9. The
company made no claim of a right to avoid or rescind
the policy until after the lawsuit had been brought.
Justice Crockett, writing the majority opinion, and
holding that there was coverage, said:
One who claims a right of rescission must
act with reasonable promptness, and if after
such knowledge, he does any substantial act
which recognizes the contract as in force,
such as the acceptance of the more than half
of the premium would be, such an act would
usually constitute a waiver of his right to
rescind.... It, (the insurance company) cannot treat the policy as void for the purpose
of defense to an action to recover for a loss
thereafter occurring, and at the same ti.me
treat it as valid for the purpose of earnmg
and collecting further premi urns.
In the instant case, the defendant accepted the
entire amount of the premium with full knowledge
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of all of the facts; the fact situation comes squarely
within that found in Farrington and thus the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
In American National Insurance Company vs.
Cooper, 458 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1969) it was held that
the insurance company waived its rights under the
policy reinstatement provisions under which accident coverage was extended only for loss sustained
after the date of reinstatement, where, following
the insured's accident it received and retained a
delinquent premium which covered the period of the
accident with full knowledge of the accident. It
appeared that the company did not require an application for reinstatement, did not issue a conditional
receipt, and otherwise regarded the policy as having
been in force.
The defendant herein attempts to excuse its
acceptance of the entire amount of the premium for
a shorter-than-normal policy period for the reason
that premium rates were higher in Arizona than in
Utah. It is submitted, however, that the insurance
company cannot by internal manipulations apply
the premiums in a manner calculated to defeat coverage for the period in question. In Bittinger vs. New
York Life Insurance Company, 112 P.2d 621 (Calif.
1941) the Supreme Court of California had before
it a situation where the insurer had accepted a
premium payment at a time when interest on a
policy loan was due. There was also money owing
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to the insured as a dividend payment. The company
subsequently refunded a portion of the premium
payment and then claimed that the remainder had
been refunded in essence by applying it to term insurance (which conveniently expired prior to the
insured's death). The California Supreme Court
held that such an attempted rescission and internal
manipulation as to the premiums so as to defeat
coverage would not be allowed. The court said,
"After accepting the money for one purpose, the
insurer could not then, without the consent or even
knowledge of the insured, apply the money in another way which would result in converting the
original policy to term insurance." Thus, the defendant should not be allowed to claim that it applied
the $48.00 premium in a manner which conveniently
deprived Betty Wickes of coverage for the critical
period in question. There is no evidence that Betty
Wickes, or any other member of the family, were
ever advised by the insurance company that it was
accepting the $48.00 check at an alleged higher premium rate for a shorter period of time. The proper
course of action for the company would have been
to have billed, or otherwise notified, the Wickes
family of the higher premium rate and let them
elect to either pay the higher premium or to accept
a shorter term of insurance. At no time was the
Wickes family ever advised that premium rates were
higher in Arizona.
Two Utah cases have been discovered which
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might be cited for the proposition that acceptance
of the premium after the loss would not constitute
a waiver of the timely payment of the premium.
Ballard vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 21
P.2d 847, 82 Utah 1 (1933); Cooper v. Forrester's
Underwriters, Inc., 275 P.2d 675, 2 U.2d 373
( 1954). However, in these cases it clearly appears
that the insurance company did not know of the
loss at the time it accepted the premium and thus
one of the critical elements of waiver, i.e. full knowledge of all of the facts, was not present.
CONCLUSION
The facts and the law are clear as to each of
the points on appeal.
1.

POINT I.
"S Coverage" is life insurance.

2. Life insurance must have a 30-day grace
period.
3. The loss occurred within the grace period,
the premium was paid within the grace period, and
thus the loss is covered.
POINT II.
The "10-40 Notice" gives rise to a 10-day
grace period.
2. The loss, i.e. the death of Homer Wickes,
occurred within the grace period.
3. The premium owing need not necessarily
1.
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be paid prior to the loss or prior to the expiration
of the grace period.
4. The usual rule is that a loss occurring within the grace period is covered, regardless of whether
the premium was paid, subject only to the Company's right to an offset.
1.

1, 1969.

POINT III.
The policy by its terms expired on August

2. Homer Wickes was killed in such a manner
as to entitle the plaintiff herein to the $10,000 death
benefit on August 2, 1969.
3. The insurance company had full knowledge
of all the facts not later than August 4, 1969.
4. The plaintiff herein was assured by an
agent of the company in late August, 1969, that if
she paid the premium that coverage would be continuous and straight through from August 1.
5. The full amount of the premium due was
mailed by the plaintiff to the defendant on August
13, 1969, and the check was accepted and cashed.
6. The "10-40 notice" cannot modify the basic
terms of the contract and can be of no benefit to the
defendant herein.
7. An insurance company can waive the provisions of its own policy.
8.

An insurance company cannot treat the
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policy in effect for the purpose of collecting premiums, but claim that it is not in effect for purposes
of meeting its obligations thereunder.

9. Acceptance of a late premium payment constitutes a waiver of the timely payment of the premium and a loss of which the company had knowledge occurring prior to the acceptance of the pre- :
mium by the company is covered.
The judgment in favor of the defendant should
be reversed and judgment should be entered in favor
of the plaintiff as prayed for in her Complaint. In
the alternative, if the court feels that there are factual issues relating to waiver or estoppel, the matter
should be remanded for trial in the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
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